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Ripeness in the Administrative Context:
Total Gas & Power of North America, Inc. v. FERC
Zachary Sterling*
INTRODUCTION
Due process is a chief concern in administrative law actions
because the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects citizens from deprivations of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.' As these proceedings exist outside of
the judicial branch, such procedural concerns are carefully
analyzed.2 However, there are many reasons potential litigants
may prefer an administrative resolution rather than pursuing one
in the judicial track. Administrative law serves multiple purposes
including defining the authority and structure of administrative
agencies, specifying the procedural formalities employed liy
agencies, determining the validity of agency decisions, and
defining the role of reviewing courts and other governmental
entities in relation to administrative agencies.3 Costs are
comparatively lower in administrative tribunals compared to costs
involved in the judicial system.4 Administrative actors and
adjudicators may be more specialized to the topic under
examination.5 Regardless, administrative adjudications relieve
courts from dealing with agency matters and clears their dockets,
which is indeed welcome in the arguably over-burdened American
legal system.
Conversely, some protest administrative rulings and
adjudications, challenging the authority of individual agencies to
decide disputes or levy punishments. Such was the circumstance
when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Total Gas & Power
* Articles Editor, KY. J. OF EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L., 2018-2019; B.A.
2014, University of Illinois at Chicago; M.A. 2017, Patterson School; M.B.A. expected May
2019, University of Kentucky; J.D. expected May 2019, University of Kentucky.
I U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
2 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2017).
STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADINIsTRATrIvE LAw AND REGULATORY POLIcY 3
(Aspen Pub., 5th ed. 2002).
4Buras v. Board of Trustees, 367 So.2d 849, 853 (La. 1979).
5 BREYER, supra note 3, at 166-67.
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N. Am., Inc. v. FERC (hereinafter "TGPNA").6 The plaintiff, Total
Gas & Power North America, Inc., (Total) contended that the
defendant, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (FERC)
did not have the authority to adjudicate claims or impose penalties
on parties violating the Natural Gas Act.7 The FERC is an
administrative agency in the eyes of the law because it is an
"authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not
it is within or subject to review by another agency."8 FERC, with
power from its statute of origin, is given authority to enforce the
acts providing for its existence: the Federal Power Act,9 the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,10 and the Natural Gas Act (NGA)."
As an alternative option for pursuing legally binding
conflict resolutions, administrative decisions face particular
difficulties that may be alien to standard judicial settings. In
TGPNA, the court found itself unable to adjudicate the dispute
brought by Total against FERC because it was limited by the
ripeness doctrine, which states "[a] claim is not ripe for
adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." 12 However,
the significant history of litigation provided within the case, as
well as other case law, indicates that when and if the claim by
Total does become ripe, the court is likely to find FERC acting
within the scope of its duties outlined in the statute that created
it.13
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief
summary of the facts of TPGNA. Part II more formally discusses
the background of FERC and its historical operation, as well as the
Natural Gas Act. Part III will delve into the issues of due process
within administrative law proceedings. Part IV analyzes the
process, authority, and effects of adjudication and rulemaking
6 Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2017).
'Id. at 327.
8 Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2011).
9 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823d (2018).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3423 (2018).
11 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2018).
12 Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3532 (3d ed. 1984)).
13 See generally Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.
2017).
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within administrative agencies like FERC. Part V considers the
ripeness doctrine and its applicability to administrative
proceedings. Lastly, Part VI lays out the benefits and consequences
of the Circuit Court's ruling.
PART 1: FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF TOTAL GAS & POWER N. AM.,
INC. V. FERC
Plaintiff-Appellant Total is a French subsidiary of one of
the world's largest oil and gas companies, Total S.A., and trades in
the North American natural gas markets.14 FERC initiated a
formal investigation into Total and two of its trading managers in
response to a tip it received from a former Total employee, who
indicated the company manipulated natural gas prices.15 The
investigation centered on allegations that Total traders
accumulated a large quantity of physical and financial natural gas
products, then traded monthly, physical fixed-price natural gas in
high volumes during a strategic period to drive up prices to benefit
its own natural gas holdings.'6 Such conduct violated the NGA's
prohibition on manipulation of natural gas markets.17 After
investigating for more than three years, the FERC's enforcement
division notified Total of its intention to recommend that the
agency begin enforcement proceedings for NGA violations and that
it would determine appropriate civil penalties.18 In response, Total
filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court, in
which it asked the court to declare that federal district courts alone
maintain the authority to adjudicate alleged violations exclusively
under the NGA, which it argued did not extend such adjudicative
power to FERC.19
Within the NGA, "The District Courts of the United States
... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this Act [15
USCS §§ 717 et seq.]"20 Total explained that it did not "seek to
14 Id. at 330.
16 Order to Show Cause & Notice of Proposed Penalty at 14, Total Gas & Power N.
Am., Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2017) (No. IN12-17-000), 2016 WL 1723518.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 331; 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2018).
18 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 330.
19 Id. at 330-31.
20 Id. at 331.
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prevent FERC from conducting an investigation or exercising its
lawful authority," but rather it wanted to maintain "Total's right
to have any violation 'adjudicated in the first instance by a federal
district court."' 2 1
In FERC's proceedings, the agency issued an order to show
cause directing Total to provide information to support a
conclusion that it was not violating the NGA. 2 2 In addition to the
order to show cause, the order provided a synopsis of both the
violation adjudication and penalty imposition processes.23 Total
filed an answer opposing the imposition of penalties and asked
FERC to dismiss the claims, at which time FERC filed a motion to
dismiss Total's claims on the grounds of ripeness in district court.2 4
Shortly thereafter, Total moved for summary judgment.25 Without
any advancement in the FERC proceedings, the district court ruled
on the combatting matters concurrently, reaching a more
advantageous result for FERC, granting its dismissal and denying
Total's motion as moot.2 6 Employing the district court's
discretionary authority to hear declaratory actions, Total's
unrelenting belief in its claims persisted.27
Total moved for reconsideration of the prior judgment,
responding to various arguments in the court's order.28 Total also
sought to amend its complaint and requested a declaration that it
did not violate the NGA in an attempt to ease the district court's
concern that the dispute would not be resolved given Total's
request for relief.29 The district court denied both of these
requests.30 Total appealed each of the district court's orders.31 The
FERC proceeding moved along without delay amid the unsettled




24 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 331.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 331-32.
2 8 
Id.
2 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 331-32.
3o Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 332.
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the enforcement division filed its opposition.33 Notwithstanding
the Office of Enforcement's petitions, as of 2018 FERC has yet to
have an Administrative Law Judge hear the case or move forward
with any further action on these motions, for that matter.34
PART II: FERC AND THE NGA
Understanding the history of the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) is critical to understanding the current role of
FERC because of the catastrophic events underlying the
restructuring of the FPC into FERC and its influence on
administrative powers.35 Formed in 1920, Congress created the
FPC to systemize the federal government's hydroelectric projects.36
Surprisingly, however, the commission was small and only
employed the Executive Secretary, although it operated under the
administrative partnership of the Secretary of War, Interior, and
Agriculture.37 Such a poorly organized operation resulted in
contradictory mandates that inhibited the production of consistent
energy policy.38 After ten years in operation, Congress instituted a
bi-partisan commission of five members to lead the FPC and
allocated sufficient funds to hire FPC staff indefinitely.39
Further legislation and judicial decisions enhanced the
FPC's objective.40 Among them, the Federal Power Act of 1935 and
the Natural Gas Act of 1938, which vested momentous power in
the FPC: the regulation of the sale and transportation of electricity
and natural gas.41 Additionally, Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin deemed the FPC as the proper jurisdiction of facilities
that produced natural gas sold in interstate commerce.42 Likewise,
City of Colton v. SoCal Edison found that the FPC possessed
jurisdiction of commercial utility power sales in interstate
33 Id. at 332.
m Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 332.







41 Id. See also Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 327.
u Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 681 (1954).
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commerce.43 The expansion of the FPC's jurisdiction resulted in
utter disarray ranging from clerical issues to operations-such
that insurmountable natural gas permit applications accumulated
and incessant brownouts occurred in the 1960s, followed by oil
conflicts like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
embargo left the country faced with an energy crisis the FPC-
even in all its new-found power-could not cure.44 Instead, this
chaos induced the reorganization of the FPC.4 5
This reorganization produced FERC in 1977, and its
responsibilities continued to expand.46 Although FERC received
greater authority over energy in the 1992 Energy Policies Act, from
the end of the 1970s to the early 1990s, deregulation was
continuous.56 These regulatory changes opened access in natural
gas pipelines, unbundled sales services from transportation
services, and exposed the markets to more competition, and served
as a means of expansion within the energy market.47 The
enactment of the Energy Policy Act in 2005 marked the creation of
the first significant energy law in over a decade.4 This act allotted
the Commission new responsibilities and the authority to carry out
those responsibilities.49 Pertinent to this case, the Commission was
granted the power to implement penalties in an attempt to deter
market manipulators.50
The legal issue in TGPNA pertains to the authority vested
in FERC to resolve and issue penalties for infringements of the
NGA.5 1 Before 2005, the NGA had given FERC "limited
enforcement powers."52 Following the industry- shaping 2005
legislation, however, FERC issued a policy statement interpreting
the newly granted authority in 2006.53 FERC asserted that
Congress did not establish a de novojudicial review process and its
4 Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 210 (1964).






49 Students Corner, supra note 35.
5 Id.
6' Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 327.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 328.
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authorization from the NGA to assess penalties under the Act
through a hearing-without parties present or with an
administrative law judge (ALJ)."4 Following this detailed policy
statement, FERC implemented "a comprehensive procedure for
assessing civil penalties under the NGA." 55
FERC's enforcement procedure was codified and outlined in
the text of the case:
1. FERC's Office of Enforcement, its main investigation
arm, reviews allegations of potential NGA violations to
determine the need for further investigation.
2. After an investigation is opened, the Office of
Enforcement uses standard discovery methods such as
document review, interviews, and internal
investigations. At any point, Enforcement may
terminate an investigation for cause.
3. If Enforcement finds a violation, "it sends the alleged
violator the factual and legal conclusions of its
investigation and its proposed penalty, to which the
alleged violator may confidentially respond."
4. If Enforcement still thinks that there has been a
violation after this communication, it attempts to
negotiate a settlement with the alleged violator. This
step marks the end of the investigation and the
beginning of the enforcement component.
5. If settlement discussions do not produce a viable
settlement between FERC and the alleged violator,
Enforcement submits a recommendation to initiate
enforcement proceedings against the alleged violator to
the five commissioners of FERC.
6. If the commissioners deem it appropriate, they issue "an
order to show cause to the alleged violator, including the
amount of Enforcement's proposed penalty" and a
statement of the facts that constitute the violation. This
order does not mean there has been a finding of an NGA
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governing FERC hearings. The Enforcement staff
involved in the investigation is not allowed to further
advise on the matter.
7. The alleged violator may file an answer to the order,
allowing it to argue that it did not violate the NGA or
that the penalty "should not be assessed or should be
reduced."
8. FERC reviews the answer. If unpersuaded, FERC
"determines what type of procedure is necessary to
adjudicate the violation" (i.e., hearing without parties or
ALJ review).
9. FERC may then proceed to a paper hearing, meaning it
only reviews the paper record. The ALJ review involves
an initial decision, sent back to FERC, to be delineated
and reviewed before considering the final penalty.
10. "FERC issues a final order in which it may adjudicate
an NGA violation and assess a civil penalty."
11. If the violator does not prevail, it has 30 days to request
a hearing with FERC.
12. If the violator is unsatisfied with the hearing, it may
then appeal to a federal Court of Appeals.
13. If the violator opts not to pay the penalty, FERC may
pursue an enforcement action in the federal district
courts.56
This case is exemplary of the Commission following its protocol
when adjudicating these offenses, although FERC has stopped
around step nine. Since the issuing of this policy statement, FERC
has not strayed from this protocol in any recorded cases.
PART III: WHETHER AND How MUCH DUE PROCESS Is DUE
The guiding doctrine of administrative law comes from the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).57 Enacted in 1946, the APA
is the federal statute governing the way federal administrative
agencies may propose, establish, and adjudicate regulations.58 To
56 Id. at 329-330.
5 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2012).
8 See id.
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protect citizens from unregulated agency action, the APA also
grants judicial oversight over all agency actions.5 9 The APA
requires agencies to keep the public informed of their organization,
procedures, and rules; provide public participation in the
rulemaking process; establish uniform standards of formal
rulemaking and adjudication; and define the scope of judicial
review.60
A pertinent issue to the case discussed in this Note is the
amount of discretion agency actions receive from the federal
judiciary upon review. In order to set aside agency actions that
were not subject to formal, trial-like procedures, the APA requires
a court to conclude the regulation is "arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."6 '
Congress may further limit the scope of judicial review of agency
actions by including such language in the organic statute.62 The
statutory deference for agency actions is especially favorable for
agencies (FERC in this instance), and the standard is a high
burden to place upon a plaintiff. In TGPNA, FERC's procedures
were not in dispute and thus, most likely were not arbitrary and
capricious.68
Total has been concerned with FERC's authority to
adjudicate NGA violations and impose civil penalties if its
proceeding found a violation because Total argues that such
allowances could contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment.6 4 While this analysis is speculative considering the
Fifth Circuit's dismissal due to lack of ripeness and the Supreme
Court deciding not to hear the case, due process considerations will
undoubtedly be litigated because of the appellate reasoning
engaged in by Total.6 5 Determining whether process is due, and if
so how much, is a layered inquiry that first asks if there is a
deprivation of property or liberty.
69 Id. at § 706.
6 Id. at § 552.
6 Id. at § 706(2)(A).
62 Id. at § 702.
6 See Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 329.
61 Id. at 331.
6 See id. at 333.
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Total claims the fines it must pay deprives it of property.6 6
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the definition
of property in its many tangible and intangible forms under the
Due Process Clause. In the case of Board ofRegents v. Roth, when
a teacher did not receive a renewed employment contract at the
end of his one-year term and was denied a hearing, he claimed he
had a property interest in continued employment and to be free of
stigma surrounding the action, which the court rejected.6 7 Roth can
be compared to Perry v. Sindermann, in which the court found a
property interest in tenure existed where a university's own
policies bolstered a ten-year college instructor's anticipation of its
reward-enough to at least grant him a hearing.6 8 In this case,
because Total would have to pay a monetary penalty, a deprivation
of property is clearly of concern.
Once a property interest is established, the Supreme Court
has also frequently addressed just how much process a person is
entitled to receive in administrative adjudications. For example,
Matthews v. Eldridge explains that the amount of due process
owed depends on the circumstances of the situation.69 In
Matthews, the respondent challenged the constitutional validity of
the procedures established and utilized by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, to determine whether there was a
continuous disability sufficient to entitle the individual to Social
Security Disability Benefits.7 0 The court set a three-part test to
determine how much process is due to a potential defendant.7 1 The
amount of process due depends on: (1) the potential effect on the
interest of the individual, (2) the likelihood of accurate results from
current and additional procedures, and (3) the government's
interest, including fiscal burdens of additional procedures.7 2 The
rationale of the Due Process Clause is to ensure both parties have
an opportunity to share their truth, not necessarily to award full
hearings simply because a property interest is present.
66 See id. at 330.
67 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1972).
68 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
69 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
70 Id. at 325.
71 Id. at 334-35.
72 Id. at 335.
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The amount of process granted could range from an
informal conversation to a full adjudicatory hearing.73 In the case
of Goldberg v. Kelly, the defendant's welfare benefits were cut off
without prior notice or a hearing, which the court held violated due
process because welfare benefits had a special status as need-
based services.74 Likewise, because of the special interests at hand,
Total will likely maintain its alleged wrongs are only properly
adjudicated within the district courts. Because the claim by Total
amounted to a deprivation of property (this is clearly the case as
Total would have to pay a fine), it was entitled to a hearing, and it
received one.75 Therefore, the validity of FERC's authority to
adjudicate disputes regarding violations of the NGA must be
considered.
PART IV: AUTHORITY AND EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE -
ADJUDICATION
In evaluating Total's case, it's important to understand how
FERC derives its jurisdiction to interpret, adjudicate, and penalize
matters according to the NGA. Total's concerns are evidenced by
its quick rush to the district court to seek a resolution. However,
upon judicial review of an agency's adjudication, courts have
granted substantial deference to the findings of an administrative
agency.76 In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court
enunciated the "substantial evidence rule" as the standard of
review, which is now codified within the APA.7 7 The substantial
evidence rule requires that the decision be based on "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion."78
Additionally, as demonstrated in Skidmore v. Swift, when
an agency interprets a statute, courts will grant deference to that
reading.79 Under Skidmore, rulings, interpretations, and opinions
7 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
74 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-65.
75 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 335.
76 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
77 See id.
78 Id. at 462.
79 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
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of the administrator "constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."80 The weight given to such agency decisions will depend
on the thoroughness of consideration, the validity of the agency's
reasoning, consistency with other decisions, and other persuasive
evidence.81 This policy of deferential treatment is critical to the
case against FERC because the agency interpreted the Energy
Power Act of 2005 when it determined it has jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims of NGA violations and impose penalties.82
Another case with historical application to administrative
agencies' interpretation of statutes is Chevron v. NRDC.83 In
Chevron, the court laid out a test to determine the validity and
accuracy of an agency's statutory interpretation when it is relevant
to its operation.8 4 The test asks whether the statute was
reasonably ambiguous, and if so, whether the agency's reasonable
interpretation was a permissible construction of the statute.85 The
scope of the test does not give deference to interpretations of the
constitution, another agency's organic statute, or of the APA. 86
If a statute is clear and unambiguous, but an agency
exceeds the bounds of a statute, then the agency's interpretation is
not entitled to such deference.8 7 This maxim is laid out in MCI
Telecommunications v. AT&T, wherein Justice Antonin Scalia
explained that when a statute vests authority in an agency with
unequivocal terms, an agency's attempt to overstep-regardless of
any internal rationale-will not be given judicial deference.88
Further, deference is granted only if the agency was delegated
authority to regulate the area in the first place.89 For example, in
United States v. Mead Corp., the court analyzed the applicability
of deference by asking if Congress generally delegated rule-making
authority to the agency in question and whether the agency's
8 Id. at 140.
81 Id.
82 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 328.
8 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8 Id. at 842-43.
8 Id. at 843.
8 Id. at 863-64.
87 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).
88 Id. at 231; contra FDAv. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 185-
86 (2000) (Congress silent on the issue but authority was inferred not to be delegated).
8 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).).
[Vol. 11 No. 2
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interpretation was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.9 0
The Chevron deference test applies to situations in which the
delegation of such authority is apparent, and the agency
implements the authority.102 In sum, when Congress delegates
such interpretive authority, the agency likely has such
authority.103
These aspects are more subject to litigation than other
points raised by Total. Closer readings of the NGA and Energy
Policy Act will determine whether FERC has the authority to
interpret its jurisdiction from its organic act. This could prove to
be a difficult decision for the court, especially because some
considerations regarding such authority weigh against each
another within this type of fact pattern. Currently, FERC is using
its authority in a manner consistent with its understanding of the
power granted by the organic statute as manifested in a FERC
policy memo. Based on the aforementioned case law, when an
agency has adjudicatory authority, courts give deference to its
statutory interpretations. In light of FERC's current practice, in
conjunction with the court's historical approach, a reviewing court
will likely decide de novo if FERC has the adjudicatory ability to
resolve the present disputed claims. However, such considerations
turn on whether an actual controversy exists.
PART V: RIPENESS AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The Fifth Circuit quashed the appeal by concluding that
Total's claims were "mere speculations about future hypothetical
events," telling Total to come back to court when FERC concludes
it has violated the NGA and imposes civil penalties.9 ' The issue
plaguing FERC's ability to adjudicate disputes over violations of
the NGA rests in the ongoing controversy, which would cease to
exist if the federal district and circuit courts issued declarations
regarding FERC's authority to adjudicate violations. In Total, the
court conceded that "a declaratory judgment action is often
9 Id. at 245
10 2 Id. at 226-27.
0 3 Id.
91 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 335.
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brought before injury has occurred."92 In order for a declaratory
judgment to be proper, however, it still must meet the ripeness
requirement.93 "A declaratory judgment action is ripe for
adjudication only where an 'actual controversy' exists."94 The term,
"actual controversy" is not readily defined, especially within the
legal context; therefore, a case-by-case analysis is proper in most
circumstances. Generally, though, an "actual controversy" exists
where "a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and
reality exists between parties having adverse legal interests."9 5
The ripeness requirement originates in Article III of the
United States Constitution, which provides the federal courts with
jurisdiction over cases and controversies.96 "The ripeness doctrine
seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because
the injury is speculative and may never occur."97 This doctrine is
meant to make courts more efficient; such that, it prevents ill use
of judicial involvement by avoiding inauspicious disputes.98 The
Fifth Circuit effectuated its reliance on two key considerations
when assessing ripeness: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial
resolution, and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.99 The court in TGPNA did not address what would
satisfy the considerations, but moved on to its previous decisions,
United Transportation Union v. Foster and Energy Transfer
Partners, L.P. v. FERC, where it previously wrestled this complex
issue.10 Had the court reexamined its original reasoning in these
two "key considerations," a different outcome would have likely
been reached. For instance, in considering the "hardship of the
parties" prong, the court should have (and maybe would have)
recognized that if judicial review is withheld, then such an outcome
effectively undermines the credibility of FERC to perform the legal
duties it was entrusted.
92 Id. at 333.
93 1d.
91 Orix Credit All., v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 2000).
-l Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 800 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1986).
- U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2.
9 Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 544 n.12 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4.1 (5th ed. 2007)).
9 Id. at 544.
- New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583, 586 (5th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
100 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 333-35.
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In determining if Total's claims were ripe, the court
addressed the company's contention that FERC's ability to issue a
final order concerning an NGA violation adjudication or impose a
civil monetary penalty is unconstitutional because such
conclusions should be made by the district court. 101 Total avowed,
however, that FERC can recommend a finding of an NGA violation
and propose a penalty.102 The cornerstone of Total's claim rested
within Section 24 of the NGA, entitled "Jurisdiction of offenses;
enforcement of liabilities and duties."103 Section 24 provides:
The District Courts of the United States ... shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the NGA
or the rules, regulations, and orders thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin
any violation of, [the NGA or any rule, regulation,
or order thereunder. ... Any suit or action to enforce
any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any
violation of, [the NGAI or any rule, regulation, or
order thereunder may be brought in any such
district or in the district wherein the defendant is an
inhabitant ... .104
According to Total, "this precludes FERC from conclusively
adjudicating such violations along with the corresponding civil
penalties, through in-house administrative proceedings."105 Total
then asked, for a declaration that "FERC's proceedings violate
various constitutional rights."10o Total claimed that such
constitutional rights include the guarantee of an impartial
tribunal provided by the Due Process Clause because
"Enforcement staff who assisted in the investigatory stage are
permitted to advise the ALJ and FERC commissioners during the
enforcement stage."107
101 Id. at 334.
1 onId.
103 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2005).
104 Id.
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The Fifth Circuit duly recognized that it does not write on
a blank slate regarding the ripeness doctrine's application to
requests for declaratory relief.1 0 8 The court relied heavily on its
ruling in Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. v. FERC, in which it
addressed the issues of ripeness in the context of a claim brought
by a party based on an identical argument to that raised by
Total.109 The court in that case acknowledged that the NGA is not
clear on the question of whether FERC could assess a civil penalty
through a hearing before an ALJ rather than a proceeding in
district court." 0 The court, however, declined to decide the
question because its resolution must wait for FERC to decide that
the NGA had been violated and assess a penalty.'' The only
difference between the cases is that in Energy Transfer Partners,
FERC issued an order for an adjudicative hearing on the merits of
the case.112 Just as Total did in this case, Energy Transfer Partners
(ETP) argued that the same section of the NGA vested exclusive
jurisdiction in a federal district court to determine de novo if ETP
had violated the NGA.11 3 In Energy Transfer Partners, the court
held that the petition for review was not ripe and dismissed it.114
Likewise in TGPNA, because FERC had not taken any
determinable action, Total's argument was even less supported
than that of ETP, which led the court to deem the alleged
controversy to be unripe.>1 5 Therefore, the court found its decision
in Energy Transfer Partners fully applicable to Total's claims and
dismissed the case.116
The court expressed clear hesitance to reverse itself.
Through such a reversal, it could have issued a declaration finally
addressing FERC's agency power of review. Within Energy
Transfer Partners, the Fifth Circuit relied further on Federal
Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company of California"1 and
i0 Id.
109 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 567 F.3d 134, 137-38 (5th Cir. 2009).
110 Id. at 143.
11, Id.
112 Id. at 136.
n1 Id. at 138.
"4 Id. at 146.
115 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 335, 339.
116 Id. at 339.
117 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 233 (1980).
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Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,118 two U.S. Supreme Court cases
that addressed how administrative rulings affect proceedings in
federal court regarding ripeness.119 In Standard Oil, without
directly addressing ripeness, the Supreme Court discussed
important policy reasons to wait until the agency has had the
chance to adjudicate.120 The court in Abbott looked at four factors
in its ripeness analysis of FERC orders: (1) whether the issues in
the case are purely legal, (2) whether the challenged decision is a
"final agency action" within the meaning of the APA, (3) whether
it has or will have a "direct and immediate impact on the
petitioners, and (3) whether resolution will foster effective
enforcement and administration by the agency.121Within Standard
Oil, the Supreme Court contrasted the regulations under
consideration in Abbott with an agency's complaint alleging
statutory violations.122 The Court concluded that "[jiudicial
intervention into the agency process denies the agency an
opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its
expertise,"123 explaining that review would "delay resolution of the
ultimate question whether the Act was violated";124 and that
review should not be a "means of turning prosecutor into defendant
before the adjudication concludes."1 25
The Fifth Circuit in TGPNA clearly erred in its failure to
align its ruling with this language and considerations set forth in
these two cases. Not only did the FERC proceeding concerning
Total not give rise to the same concerns before the Supreme Court,
but the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Energy Transfer Partners also falls
short in a similar manner.126 Regardless of whether FERC's input
in these proceedings constitutes a "final agency decision," the other
factors outweigh that consideration. The court's decision to refrain
from deciding if FERC is correctly determining and penalizing
118 Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
119 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 567 F.3d at 139-40.
120 Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 241.
121 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 567 F.3d 134, 139-40 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 368 (5th Cir.
1981)).
122 Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 239-241.




125 Id. at 243.
12 See, e.g., Energy Transfer Partners, 567 F.3d at 141.
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violations of the NGA, in turn, prevents the effective operation of
an agency designed and specifically commissioned to make those
decisions. The weight of the contravening factors in this situation
should convince the court to issue a ruling. If the court were to rule
on this issue under the tenor of the aforementioned cases, it is
probable FERC would be justified in its power to adjudicate
violations and levy penalties. The Supreme Court is inclined to
give deference to agencies to make their own decisions, as judicial
intervention could delay resolution of the ultimate questions asked
by the agency and its investigation.12 7
As to the first factor in Abbott, the issues considered are
here are purely legal. Without regard to who brought the motion
for a declaratory judgment, the court has the discretion to make
such a judgment if it follows the analysis laid out by the Supreme
Court and in other previous cases. Neither party requested that
the federal courts evaluate issues of fact.12 8 FERC wanted these
issues to be resolved by a paper review or an ALJ hearing, and
nothing seemed to indicate that Total sought declaration on any
factual finding. 129 The second Abbott factor does weigh in favor of
a dismissal for lack of ripeness as there has been no "final agency
action," because FERC's proceedings are still underway.130 The
third factor seems simple enough-the agency action does
maintain a direct and immediate impact upon the petitioners.13 1
The court's ruling will affect whether FERC can effectively
adjudicate and penalize alleged violators of the NGA. That ability
directly affects the future of Total. Finally, the resolution of the
issues by the district court will undoubtedly foster rather than
impede the effective enforcement and administration by the
agency.132 Of the four factors within the Abbott case, only the
second factor cuts in favor of dismissal for lack of ripeness.1 33 FERC
was created to enforce the NGA and other energy acts designed to
protect the market and environment.13 4 In its decision to withhold
'2 Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 242.
128 See generally Total Gas, 859 F.3d 325.
129 Id. at 333.
:0 Supra note 136.
131 Id.
I32 Id.
1n3 See Energy Transfer Partners, 567 F.3d at 139-40.
' 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2005).
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judgment on the process by which FERC adjudicates and evaluates
these claims, the court inadvertently left FERC to navigate a dark
space of uncertainty regarding its vested authority from the NGA
itself.
In Abbott, the Supreme Court held that the regulations in
question were definitive statements and had a "direct and
immediate" effect on the day-to-day business of the complaining
parties.135 The Court determined the regulations rose to the status
of law, in which it necessitated immediate compliance with the
terms of the regulations.136 The Court also found the alternative to
compliance could be even more expensive and "may risk serious
criminal and civil sanctions."137 Thus, those regulations were ripe
for review. 138
There are some patent differences between the Abbott case
and TGPNA, evidenced in part by the fact that FERC does not even
go as far as to ask for a review of its findings.139 These findings
have not been made. The district court need only rule that FERC
has the authority to do so. The implications are as important as
they were in Abbott. FERC is dealing with violators of the NGA,
which has a widespread effect on both the market and the
population of the United States.140 Non-compliance with FERC and
its findings has severe consequences for the public.141 To continue
to signal that FERC may not be authorized to adjudicate and
penalize claims of violations casts widespread doubt for regulated
actors as to the likelihood that they could be penalized for violating
the NGA. In addition to not comporting with the intent of the
courts, refraining from judicial intervention is bad public policy.
The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims
of violations of the NGA, but within FERC's policy promulgation
and even within the language of the NGA, the district courts are
to enter the process when the alleged violator does not adhere to a




'3 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 325, 335.
140 See generally David Crump, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 70 MINN. L. REV. 61 (1985).
141 Id.
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settlement or resolution decided by an ALJ.1 42 Such jurisdiction is
critical to the operation of FERC and by denying a definitive
ruling, the courts disincentivize FERC to effectively police the Act
that designated its parameters in the first place.
PART VI: EFFECTS OF THIS RULING
Striking down TGPNA due to ripeness is likely in the best
interest of precedent for the ripeness doctrine, but broader public
policy considerations should be examined. By remaining silent on
FERC's ability to adjudicate claims of NGA violations, the judicial
branch is signaling that the interests of FERC do not rise to the
level at which the courts would issue a declaration that FERC may
exercise the authority it believes itself to have.
While "following the ripeness" is a vital maxim to maintain,
declaratory judgments have empirically greater leeway,
considering Energy Transfer Partners.143 The court should be
willing to consider alternative avenues of adjudication to preserve
the effectiveness of FERC and its investigations. The standards of
review and due process requirements leave enough room for the
court to act within its powers and grant a declaration. Leaving the
issue undetermined only hampers the effectiveness of FERC
proceedings and any claims it brings against potential violators of
the acts it oversees. Even Total argued it would be harmed in the
interim if relief was not granted or denied immediately.144 The
necessity of resolute policy is apparent on both sides of this
dispute. By allowing the Energy Transfer Partners decision to
control the outcome, the court is stifling meaningful discourse
surrounding the ability of FERC to adjudicate these claims and
levy penalties. Such uncertainty is bad for the natural gas industry
and abhorrent to the judicial branch as a whole, regardless of the
ripeness of the claims.
142 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2005).
14 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 567 F.3d at 134.
144 Total Gas, 859 F.3d at 337.
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CONCLUSION
FERC was probably granted the ability to enforce the NGA
according to the language of the statute. Total is attempting to
hamper the process with a poorly timed legal action. The district
court should have been able to see through the rouse, and so
certainly also should the Fifth Circuit. However, FERC is not
currently so lucky. After multiple actions in the past ten years, no
court has ruled as of yet on the ability of FERC to adjudicate its
disputes and levy penalties where it sees fit. While the courts have
not gone so far as to prevent FERC from continuing investigations
and potentially even proposing violations and penalties, the lack of
a definitive ruling paints a similar picture against FERC's ability
to adjudicate such claims.
For FERC to effectively adjudicate NGA violations, the
courts must either patently approve, or at least acquiesce, to its
jurisdiction over NGA claims. The broader implication of this
judicial silence is that potential violators still have a backdoor
through which to escape prosecution for violations by merely
claiming that FERC is operating beyond the scope of its
authorization. Such violators could even use the threat of district
court litigation to dissuade FERC from continuing its investigation
if such litigation is strong enough to curb its desire to investigate.
The outcome is clear: refraining from issuing a declaratory
judgment of this nature impairs public policy and does not comport
with the language of precedent for the Fifth Circuit, nor does
silence aid FERC's agency actions in any way.145 Withholding a
confirmation of authorization from FERC is a disincentive to the
agency as a whole to zealously enforce the NGA. It allows violators
an upper hand in negotiations and continues to prevent fruitful
discourse surrounding compliance with the NGA in general. As
this case approaches its conclusion, deference to agencies
maintaining their ability to enforce the statutes which organically
created them remains in the public's best interest.
145 Energy Transfer Partners, 567 F.3d at 134.
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